Victims in Life, Victims in Death — Keeping Burial Rights Out of the Hands of Slayers by Bremenstul, Minia E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74 | Number 1
Fall 2013
Victims in Life, Victims in Death — Keeping Burial
Rights Out of the Hands of Slayers
Minia E. Bremenstul
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Minia E. Bremenstul, Victims in Life, Victims in Death — Keeping Burial Rights Out of the Hands of Slayers, 74 La. L. Rev. (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol74/iss1/9
 
 
Victims in Life, Victims in Death—Keeping Burial 
Rights Out of the Hands of Slayers 
INTRODUCTION 
It often takes tragedy to bring about change. In 2009, Constance 
Shepherd was brutally murdered at the hands of her husband, 
Stephen Shepherd.1 Her body was found in their New York home—
her throat slashed by a medieval-style sword.2 While still grieving 
the loss of their loved one, Constance’s surviving family members 
were victimized yet again:3 As Constance’s surviving spouse, 
Stephen Shepherd had the sole right under New York law to control 
the disposition of her remains,4 despite being charged with her 
murder.5 Contrary to her family’s wishes,6 Shepherd left 
Constance’s body in the morgue for more than a month before 
having his attorney cremate and bury her remains near his favorite 
fishing spot, hundreds of miles away from her family and home in 
New York.7  
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 1. Dean G. Skelos, Senate Passes Bill to Protect Remains of Crime Victims, 
NY STATE SENATE (May 14, 2012), http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/senate 
-passes-bill-protect-remains-crime-victims-0. 
 2. Rich Newberg, Man Pleads Guilty in Death of His Wife, WIVB.COM 
(Oct. 13, 2009, 7:17 PM), http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/crime/Man_pleads 
_guilty_in_death_of_his_wife_20091013. 
 3. “Homicide is a crime with more than one victim.” OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF 
CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIRST RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: A 
GUIDEBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 53 (2010), available at 
http://www.ovc.gov/publications/infores/pdftxt/2010FirstResponseGuidebook.pdf 
(referring to survivors of homicide victims). 
 4. “Disposition” or “final disposition” refers to the lawful disposing of a 
dead body, which may include burial, interment, cremation, anatomical donation, 
or other authorized disposition. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102(a)(2)(C) 
(Westlaw 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005(32) (Westlaw 2013); N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013).  
 5. Skelos, supra note 1. Shepherd pleaded guilty to manslaughter and agreed 
to a 21-year sentence. Newberg, supra note 2. 
 6. Constance’s family objected to Shepherd’s burying of her cremated 
remains on Mount Tremper at a Buddhist temple in the Catskills and believed that 
his choice was intentionally disrespectful. See Tom Precious, State Bill Would 
Deny Killer Control of Victim Burial, THE BUFFALO NEWS, May 15, 2012, 
available at 2012 WLNR 10272924. Conversely, Shepherd indicated to his 
attorney that it would have been his dead wife’s wish because they were both 
practicing Buddhists. Id. 
 7. See Michael Gormley, NY Seeks to Deny Murderers Spousal Burial 
Rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 14, 2012), available at http://bigstory.ap.org 
/content/ny-seeks-deny-murderers-spousal-burial-rights; Michael Regan, Loophole 
Closed Allowing Control of Victim’s Body, TONAWANDA NEWS, Oct. 26, 2012, 
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The public outcry over Constance Shepherd’s story and other 
similar tragedies prompted the New York State Legislature to 
amend its disposition of remains law in order to prevent murderers 
from controlling the disposition of their victims’ remains.8 The law 
prohibits any person who, “at the time of the decedent’s death, was 
the subject of an order of protection protecting the decedent; or . . . 
[who] has been arrested or charged with any crime . . . allegedly 
causally related to the death of the decedent” from having “the right 
to control the disposition of the remains of the decedent.”9 While 
New York has closed its statutory gap that allowed “slayers”10 to 
control the burial of their victims, many states have not yet remedied 
this alarming oversight in the law.11 Consequently, in some states, 
murderers like Stephen Shepherd continue to have the ability to 
control the location, timing, and method of the disposition of their 
victims’ remains. 
Nearly all states have “slayer statutes” to ensure that slayers may 
not inherit property or receive life insurance benefits as a result of 
their criminal acts,12 but many states have not extended this 
prohibition to the power of slayers to legally dispose of their 
victims’ bodies.13 Although all states have enacted statutory 
                                                                                                             
 
http://tonawanda-news.com/local/x674151912/Loophole-closed-allowing-control-
of-victims-body. 
 8. See New York to Deny Burial Right of Convicted Murders, THE DAILY 
NEWS, June 12, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 12776024. Another case 
prompted action in New York: a murderer who beheaded his wife was able to 
control the timing and location of her burial. Gormley, supra note 7. A week 
before she was killed, the mother of three had filed for divorce. Id. 
 9. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (amended in 2012 to include a provision 
calling for forfeiture when a person is arrested or charged with the decedent’s 
death). 
 10. Throughout this Comment, the term “slayer” is used in a broader sense 
than the word “murderer.” A person who commits murder is one who kills another 
with malice aforethought. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (9th ed. 2009). 
“Slayer” as used in this Comment refers to a person who commits an offense that 
precludes the person from inheriting from his or her victim under the state’s slayer 
statute. Slayer is generally defined as “a person who kills another, or who 
participates in killing another, by an act that is felonious, intentional, and without 
legal excuse or justification.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011). However, the scope of offenses included in slayer 
statutes varies by jurisdiction. See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 99 (Westlaw 2013). For 
example, many statutes also encompass voluntary manslaughter, and some even 
reach negligent homicide. See id.; see also infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 12. The slayer rule “has been legislated in most U.S. jurisdictions and in the 
few others it has been applied by common-law doctrines.” Nili Cohen, The Slayer 
Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 797 (2012). 
 13. See infra note 91.  
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guidance concerning the order and priority of persons with the right 
to control final disposition,14 nearly half lack forfeiture provisions15 
to account for situations in which one of those individuals is 
criminally responsible for the decedent’s death.16 Furthermore, even 
state statutes that do have forfeiture provisions often do not provide 
adequate coverage. First, some provisions do not encompass all 
victim–offender relationships; several address only certain 
categories of familial homicides, like spousal murders, while others 
do not provide for forfeiture if the deceased specifically designated 
the slayer to act as his or her agent for disposition.17 Second, many 
provisions only contemplate forfeiture once criminal charges have 
been brought, ignoring the timing considerations involved with 
making disposition decisions as well as establishing probable cause 
for an arrest.18 Third, statutes often do not provide an individual 
who has forfeited the right of disposition the opportunity to 
challenge the forfeiture in a timely manner.19 
States must ensure that disposition rights are not granted to 
slayers by virtue of poorly crafted disposition of remains statutes.20 
Instead, these statutes should require forfeiture for any person 
granted the right to control disposition, whether by designation or by 
law, who is criminally responsible for the decedent’s death. 
Forfeiture is essential to protect not only a decedent from being 
victimized a second time by his or her slayer but also the victim’s 
grieving survivors from being rendered powerless and unable to 
control the final resting place of their loved one. As long as an 
individual subject to forfeiture is given notice and an opportunity to 
be heard when forfeiture takes place, the rights of all parties—the 
accused, the surviving family members, and the victim—will be 
                                                                                                             
 14. See infra notes 91, 137.  
 15. A forfeiture provision is a clause in a statute “stating that, under certain 
circumstances,” a person must lose “a right, privilege, or property.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 722 (defining “forfeiture” and “forfeiture clause”). 
 16. See infra note 91. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 20. Throughout this Comment, the author refers to statutes governing the 
disposition of remains as “disposition of remains statutes.” Such statutes have also 
been referred to as “bodily remains statutes,” “sepulture statutes,” or “priority of 
decision laws.” See, e.g., Tracie M. Kester, Note, Uniform Acts–Can the Dead 
Hand Control the Dead Body? The Case for A Uniform Bodily Remains Law, 29 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 571 (2007) (using the phrases “bodily remains statutes” and 
“sepulture statutes”); Ann M. Murphy, Please Don’t Bury Me Down in That Cold 
Cold Ground: The Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human Remains, 
15 ELDER L.J. 381 (2007) (using the phrase “priority of decision laws”). 
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taken into account, and the right of disposition will be in the proper 
hands. 
This Comment examines the current state of disposition of 
remains laws in the United States, identifies the problematic 
loopholes present in many statutes that permit slayers to control the 
disposition of their victims’ bodies, and recommends the necessary 
statutory amendments to keep disposition rights out of the hands of 
slayers. Part I discusses the evolution of the American slayer rule, as 
well as its inherent limitation—The victim’s body is not treated as 
property forming part of the victim’s estate, and thus the slayer rule 
does not cover the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s 
body. The slayer’s ability to control the disposition is therefore 
treated within state statutory regimes governing the disposition of 
remains. Part II examines current statutory regimes in states without 
forfeiture provisions and also highlights the deficiencies present in 
regimes that do call for forfeiture. Part III provides guidance for 
state legislatures seeking to revise their disposition of remains laws 
to prevent slayers from potentially having the legal authority to 
control their victims’ dispositions. In doing so, Part III makes 
recommendations for determining the proper scope of forfeiture 
provisions and for safeguarding due process rights. Finally, the 
Appendix contains a model disposition of remains statute 
encompassing the statutory provisions necessary to keep disposition 
rights out of the hands of slayers. 
I. FAMILY HOMICIDES AND THE SLAYER RULE 
Domestic violence experts have noted that “‘[w]ith the 
exception of the police and the military, the family is perhaps the 
most violent social group, and the home the most violent social 
setting, in our society.’”21 In the United States, 22% of homicide 
victims are killed by a spouse or another family member.22 Between 
1980 and 2008, the offender in 10% of homicides was a spouse, and 
12% of offenders were other family members of the victim.23 This 
latter statistic includes parricide (the murder of a parent by a child), 
                                                                                                             
 21. Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for 
Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401, 403 (1995) (quoting RICHARD J. GELLES & 
MURRAY A. STRAUS, CRIME AND THE FAMILY 88 (A.J. Lincoln & M.A. Straus 
eds., 1985)). 
 22. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008 16 
(2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. This 
statistic only includes homicides for which the victim–offender relationship was 
known. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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filicide (the killing of a child by a parent), and siblicide (the murder 
of a sibling).24 
Although there is now heightened awareness and concern 
surrounding family violence,25 domestic violence has largely been 
ignored due to society’s traditional belief that it was a “private 
matter” that was “best resolved behind closed doors.”26 While 
criminal law has evolved to address family violence,27 the legal 
response to familial homicides has been complicated by this 
traditional societal view.28 Consequently, there is still much progress 
to be made.29 
A. The Slayer Rule and Slayer Statutes 
The problem of familial murders is not new.30 Although the law 
cannot mend the harm caused by such killings, courts and 
legislatures have supplemented criminal law punishments with the 
common law slayer rule, “[t]he doctrine that neither a person who 
kills another nor the killer’s heirs can share in the decedent’s 
                                                                                                             
 24. Although these categories of family homicide are the most common, this 
statistic also includes homicides committed by other family members. Id. at 21. 
For a discussion of the different types of family homicides, see Chelsea Diem & 
Jesenia M. Pizarro, Social Structure and Family Homicides, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 
521 (2010). 
 25. See Proclamation No. 887777, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,611 (Oct. 1, 2012).  
 26. Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the 
Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 196 (2008). 
See also Bernadette Dunn Sewell, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and 
Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 
992 (1989) (“Courts were initially slow to heed the change in public opinion . . . . 
They emphasized the importance of family autonomy and privacy by displaying a 
hesitancy to invade the domestic forum.”). 
 27. See Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and 
the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2009) 
(discussing the recent trend towards the criminalization of domestic violence). 
 28. ADRIA GALLUP-BLACK, RURAL AND URBAN TRENDS IN FAMILY AND 
INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE: 1980–1999 1 (2004), available at https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208344.pdf. 
 29. Although the country has made some progress with respect to changing 
laws and attitudes toward domestic violence, three women a day in the United 
States still lose their lives as a result of domestic violence. See Proclamation No. 
887777, supra note 25. 
 30. “One of the earliest recorded episodes implicating [this] problem . . . 
appears to be the Biblical story of Cain and Abel. Spurred by jealousy, ‘Cain rose 
up against Abel his brother, and slew him.’” Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s 
Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the Extended Slayer Rule 
Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 101 (2007) (quoting Genesis 4:8 (King 
James)). 
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estate.”31 The slayer rule embodies the maxim that one cannot 
benefit from one’s own crime.32 Nearly all United States 
jurisdictions have codified the slayer rule into “slayer statutes,” 
which “prohibit[] a person’s killer from taking any part of the 
decedent’s estate through will or intestacy.”33 Grounded in “moral, 
equitable, and legal principles,”34 a version of the slayer rule appears 
in nearly every legal system.35 
1. The Evolution of the American Slayer Rule 
At early English common law, the doctrines of attainder, 
forfeiture of lands and chattels, corruption of blood, and escheat 
obviated the need for a slayer rule, as neither a slayer nor the 
slayer’s heirs had the opportunity to benefit from the criminal 
wrongdoing.36 However, in 1814 Parliament began enacting a series 
                                                                                                             
 31. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1515. 
 32. Christopher M. Eisold, Statute in the Abyss: The Implications of Insanity 
on Wisconsin’s Slayer Statute, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 875 (2008). 
 33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1515. See supra note 12 
and accompanying text. 
 34. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102. 
 35. Cohen, supra note 12, at 794. Civil law countries also refuse to permit 
slayers to inherit property from their victims under the doctrine of unworthy heirs. 
“Unworthiness is derived from two Roman institutions: (1) Exheredatio, the 
power of the father to exclude his children from the succession; . . . . [and] (2) 
Eremptorium, the exclusion of certain heirs for unworthiness, in case of the 
decedent’s silence.” 3 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 
517–18 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959) (11th ed. 1938). An unworthy person is 
deprived of his succession because he has “failed in some duty towards the 
deceased” and, therefore, does “not deserve to inherit from him.” KATHRYN 
VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 5:3, in 10 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 141 (2d ed. 2009). 
 36. Julie J. Olenn, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: New York’s Slayer Rule and In Re 
Estates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2001). Under the doctrine of 
attainder, a person’s civil rights were extinguished if the person was convicted of a 
capital offense. Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty—History of Problem in Anglo-
American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 229, 232–33 (1942). As incidents of 
attainder, the land and property of the criminal were then forfeited to the King as 
punishment, which would have included any property the criminal inherited from 
the victim. Id. The doctrine of corruption of blood barred the murderer’s heirs 
“unto the remotest generation” from inheriting, as the “blood of the attainted 
person was said to be corrupt.” Id. at 233. Furthermore, under the law of feudal 
escheat, which “was superadded to the earlier law of forfeiture,” the felon’s land 
was said to escheat to the lord because he or she left no lawful successor—the 
felon’s bloodline was corrupted, so its inheritable quality was extinguished and 
“blotted out forever.” Id. at 233–34. Because the crown was very frequently also 
the superior lord, the two doctrines of forfeiture and escheat have often been 
confused. 11 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 316 (David 
S. Garland et al. eds., 2d ed. 1899) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPÆDIA]. However, 
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of statutes to eliminate these archaic doctrines.37 Fifty-six years later 
it passed the Forfeiture Act of 1870, which “abolished the entire 
doctrine of attainder, forfeiture and corruption of blood, or 
escheat.”38 It was not until after this Act was passed that the courts 
of England were faced with the situation of slayers potentially 
taking their victims’ property.39 To address the problem, the courts 
promulgated the “rule of public policy,” which prohibited slayers 
from benefiting from their own wrongdoing.40 
Because Parliament did not pass the Forfeiture Act until after the 
American Revolution took place, the law in colonial America 
initially encompassed the early common law doctrines.41 Their 
existence, however, was relatively short-lived; constitutional and 
statutory enactments soon expressly abrogated them.42 As a result, 
slayers attempted to reap benefits from their crimes, claiming that 
otherwise they were “being denied what was ‘rightfully’ theirs.”43 In 
response, American courts also relied on the rule of public policy 
                                                                                                             
 
forfeiture of the offender’s land and possessions to the King as criminal 
punishment was the doctrine of the old Anglo-Saxon law—it had nothing to do 
with the feudal system. Id. at 316–17. Feudal escheat did not come about in 
England until the time of the Norman Conquest. Id. at 317. Feudal escheat was at 
first subordinate to the law of forfeiture but later prevalent during the English 
feudal period. Reppy, supra, at 233–34. Under feudal escheat, a tenant’s 
conviction was considered a breach of the lease of the land, so the feud reverted 
back to the superior lord. ENCYCLOPÆDIA, supra, at 316. If the King acquired an 
estate as the superior lord, it was not as a sovereign but rather as a proprietor. Id. 
Further, forfeiture applied to both land and possessions, while escheat applied only 
to land. Id. 
 37. Reppy, supra note 36, at 234. 
 38. Id. at 238. However, there was an exception for forfeiture consequent 
upon outlawry. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 242. See also infra Part I.A.2. 
 41. Reppy, supra note 36, at 244. 
 42. See id.  
[I]n 1789, the Federal Constitution led the way in providing: “The 
Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no 
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except 
during the life of the person attainted.” Similar provision [sic] have been 
incorporated into some of our state constitutions. Generally, however, in 
other states the matter has been covered by statutory enactments 
providing that conviction of a felony shall not work a forfeiture or 
corruption of blood. 
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2). 
 43. Sara M. Gregory, Paved with Good ‘Intentions’: The Latent Ambiguities 
in New Jersey’s Slayer Statute, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 824 (2010). 
220 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
and the fundamental maxims of the common law to keep disposition 
rights out of the hands of slayers.44 
2. The Rule of Public Policy 
Unlike the penal nature of criminal law or the compensatory 
function of tort law, the slayer rule, the name frequently used to 
refer to the rule of public policy, instead propagates the maxim that 
no man shall benefit or profit from his wrong.45 The underlying 
moral principle is that human life is sacred.46 Additionally, “[t]he 
law of unjust enrichment forecloses the possibility that a person 
might benefit from committing a felonious and intentional 
homicide.”47 Further, an individual should not be legally permitted 
to control the transfer of another’s property by bringing about that 
person’s death.48 These principles also seek to preserve the victim’s 
intent—presumably that he or she would not want the slayer to 
benefit by virtue of the killing.49 
In the early 20th century, states began adopting “slayer statutes” 
in order to prevent slayers from receiving property as a result of 
killing their victims.50 Now, nearly all states have slayer statutes 
                                                                                                             
 44. See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (“It 
would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover 
insurance money payable on the death of the party whose life he had feloniously 
taken.”); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (“To answer these 
questions in the affirmative it seems to me would be a reproach to the 
jurisprudence of our state, and an offense against public policy.”); Weaver v. 
Hollis, 22 So. 2d 525, 527 (Ala. 1945) (“A reasonable interpretation of [the 
statute], in the light of the common-law principle that no person can take 
advantage of his own wrong; that the law permits no one to profit by his own 
crime, precludes a felonious killer from taking from his murdered spouse.”). 
 45. See Bradley Myers, The New North Dakota Slayer Statute: Does It Cause 
A Criminal Forfeiture?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2007); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. a (2003). 
One court elaborated: 
The rule is believed to have its antecedents in ancient maxims of general 
jurisprudence: No man shall take advantage of his own wrong and its 
Law-French and Latin counterparts—(1) Nul prenda advantage de son 
tort demesne; (2) Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia; 
(3) Jus ex injuria non oritur; (4) Nemo allegans suam turpitudinem est 
audiendus; and (5) Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem. 
State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027, 1035 n.6 
(Okla. 1985) (Opala, J., concurring) (alteration to original). 
 46. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102. 
 47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 
cmt. a (2011). 
 48. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102–03. 
 49. Id. at 103. 
 50. Myers, supra note 45, at 1002. 
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codifying the principles underlying the rule of public policy.51 While 
the statutes differ from state to state, they generally address the same 
issues: who qualifies as a slayer, what property is forfeited, and who 
then receives the property.52 There is no question as to the 
recognition and legitimacy of the slayer rule; however, uncertainties 
remain as to its scope.53 
B. The Slayer Rule’s Inherent Limitation 
Despite judicial recognition that “the burial of the dead is a 
subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater 
degree than many matters of actual property,”54 the slayer rule does 
not extend to the right to control the disposition of a person’s 
remains. The slayer rule applies to a decedent’s estate, which is 
composed of “[t]he real and personal property that a person 
possesses at the time of death and that passes to the heirs or 
testamentary beneficiaries.”55 Additionally, most states apply their 
slayer statutes to life insurance proceeds.56 But because there is no 
property right in a body, it does not form part of the decedent’s 
estate.57 
                                                                                                             
 51. “The rule is currently found in forty-eight states and also in the Uniform 
Probate Code § 2-803 (2006).” Cohen, supra note 12, at 797 n.32. The remaining 
two states address the situation through case law. Anne-Marie Rhodes, 
Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 975, 979 n.21 (2007) (“Neither Massachusetts nor New Hampshire 
has a statute, but each has case law precedent to prevent a killer from inheriting. 
Maryland takes an interesting bifurcated approach, relying on case law for the 
slayer, but essentially barring the slayer’s issue [every living lineal descendant] 
from inheriting by statute.” (citations omitted)). Louisiana’s slayer statute reflects 
its civil law tradition, using the doctrine of unworthiness to prevent slayers from 
inheriting. The Louisiana Civil Code provides: “A successor shall be declared 
unworthy if he is convicted of a crime involving the intentional killing, or 
attempted killing, of the decedent or is judicially determined to have participated 
in the intentional, unjustified killing, or attempted killing, of the decedent.” LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 941 (2013). As an effect of being declared unworthy, “[t]he 
successor is deprived of his right to the succession to which he had been called.” 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 945 (2013). 
 52. Myers, supra note 45, at 1004. 
 53. Cohen, supra note 12, at 794. “The still vivid discussion . . . revolves 
around several partially overlapping tensions: law and morality; text and context; 
rules and standards; public and private; civil and criminal liability; courts and 
legislators.” Id. 
 54. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237–38 
(1872).  
 55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 629. 
 56. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely A Matter of Equity, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 489, 506 (1986). 
 57. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 3 (Westlaw 2013). 
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Early English common law adopted the position that there was 
no right of property—and thus no ownership right—in dead 
bodies.58 The English courts developed this rule in response to 
citizens’ attempts to direct the disposition of their remains by 
testament.59 As Sir Edward Coke famously stated, the burial of 
corpses was “nullius in bonis”60—belonging to no one;61 thus, 
disposition could not be declared by will.62 Legal scholars believe 
that this rule was promulgated as a result of the jurisdictional divide 
between the secular courts and ecclesiastical courts in England.63 
Because people were traditionally buried in church cemeteries,64 the 
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the dead and the burial 
process instead of the secular courts.65 The dead were considered 
objects sacred to God rather than objects of property.66 
American courts initially adopted the English common law rule 
that there are no property rights in the dead.67 Thus, the body is not 
treated as property that forms part of the estate,68 and consequently 
slayer statutes do not revoke the right to dispose of a decedent’s 
remains. Because there is no true property right in a dead body,69 the 
theory of “quasi-property” emerged as a way for courts to mitigate 
the harsh consequences of the common law rule.70 
                                                                                                             
 58. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite 
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2012); Tanya K. Hernández, The 
Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 982 (1999). 
 59. Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing 
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
207, 225 (1986). 
 60. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND 
CRIMINAL CAUSES 203 (W. Clarke & Sons, 1809). See also Balganesh, supra note 
58, at 1896. 
 61. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1173. 
 62. Hardiman, supra note 59, at 225. 
 63. Id. at 226. 
 64. Kester, supra note 20, at 573–74. 
 65. Hardiman, supra note 59, at 226. In modern English law, legal courts of 
general jurisdiction govern the burial process. Id. 
 66. Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 
195, 228 (1996). 
 67. Id. 
 68. W. C. Rodgers, Property Rights in Human Bodies, 73 CENT. L.J. 39, 39 
(1911) (“But the body does not descend by inheritance. The heir inherits the 
property of his ancestor, dying intestate, yet he will not come into the possession 
or ownership of his dead body through the law of descent.”). 
 69. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (Westlaw 2013). 
 70. Ducor, supra note 66, at 228–29. Over time, English courts also began to 
recognize a quasi-property right of the next of kin in the decedent’s body. Kester, 
supra note 20, at 574. 
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II. AN EXAMINATION OF DISPOSITION OF REMAINS STATUTES 
Nearly all states have enacted special legislation to create legal 
recognition of the quasi-property right of next of kin and other 
individuals in a decedent’s remains for disposition purposes.71 
However, these disposition of remains statutes vary widely, 
especially with respect to the inclusion and scope of forfeiture 
provisions. 
A. Rights in Remains  
The majority of U.S. courts faced with the issue of whether there 
is a property interest in a decedent’s remains agree that some kind of 
right does exist and often label it as a “quasi-property right.”72 As 
quasi-property, no one owns the decedent’s body, but instead there 
is a custodial interest over the deceased person’s remains for 
purposes of disposition.73 In England, the right and duty to dispose 
of remains belongs to the executor.74 However, this is not the case in 
the United States. Because the body is not considered property 
included as part of the probate estate,75 it is not subject to 
administration by the executor.76 Instead, the right vests in the 
decedent’s next of kin—“[t]he person or persons most closely 
related to a decedent by blood or affinity.”77 
                                                                                                             
 71. See infra notes 91, 137. 
 72. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(citing In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.5 (Utah 1978); Arnaud v. 
Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th 
Cir. 1984)). However, some courts have abandoned the quasi-property theory in 
favor of a mental anguish or infliction of emotional distress tort remedy, 
suggesting that the quasi-property right in a body is a legal fiction that does not 
protect a true ownership interest. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human 
Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 385 (2000). 
 73. Balganesh, supra note 58, at 1897. 
 74. Russell E. Haddleton, What to Do with the Body? The Trouble with 
Postmortem Disposition, 20 PROB. & PROP. 55, 56 (2006). 
 75. The probate estate is “[a] decedent’s property subject to administration by 
a personal representative. The probate estate comprises property owned by the 
decedent at the time of death and property acquired by the decedent’s estate at or 
after the time of death.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1322. 
 76. Haddleton, supra note 74, at 56. 
 77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1142. Although the specific 
rights granted by statute vary by state, “toward the end of the 19th century, . . . 
courts began to recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and 
control the disposition of the bodies of their dead relatives, the violation of which 
was actionable at law.” Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791–92 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
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This right generally includes not only the right to determine the 
timing, place, and manner of disposition78 but also “the right to have 
[the body] remain in its final resting place, the right to remove the 
body to a proper place, and the right to maintain an action to recover 
damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the 
deceased.”79 Although some courts differ on the exact classification 
of the interest,80 every state has codified the principle that a 
decedent’s next of kin have an exclusive right to possess the 
decedent’s remains for the purpose of disposition.81 Right of 
disposition statutes provide a list of persons, generally in order of 
priority, who have the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s 
remains.82 The traditional rule in most jurisdictions is that the right 
of disposition vests first in the surviving spouse.83 This order of 
priority stems from the early belief that “[t]he bond of matrimony is 
the closest of all human ties.”84 Accordingly, courts have held that 
“[i]n the guardianship of the remains of a deceased person the 
marital right prevails over that of the next of kin.”85 If no surviving 
spouse exists, generally the right then vests in the adult children of 
                                                                                                             
 78. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in 
Human Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 31 
(2002). “The history of how human remains have been treated, mistreated, stolen, 
sold, and used in underground trade” brought about “statutory approaches to 
disposing human remains, as well as the law governing coroners, and the 
constitutional interpretation of property.” Denay L. Wilding Knope, Over My 
Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions Complicate the Constitutional Dilemma 
of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 173 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 79. 8 AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FORMS Dead Bodies § 1 (Westlaw 2013). But see 
infra note 206 and accompanying text.  
 80. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480–81 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 81. See infra notes 91, 137. However, some states allow decedents to leave 
disposition instructions or appoint an agent for disposition. See infra note 88 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, Ashes to Ashes: Comparative Law Regarding 
Survivors’ Disputes Concerning Cremation and Cremated Remains, 17 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 316 (2008).  
 83. Murphy, supra note 20, at 401. Virginia, however, has a unique statute in 
that it places the spouse and next of kin on equal footing. See VA. CODE ANN. § 
54.1-2807 (Westlaw 2013) (“The authority and directions of any next of kin shall 
govern the disposal of the body, subject to the provisions of § 54.1-2807.01 or 
54.1-2825.” (emphasis added)); see also discussion infra Part II.B.1.e. 
 84. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 231 (1872). 
See also Leschey v. Leschey, 97 A.2d 784, 787 (Pa. 1953) (“The reason for the 
preference given to the surviving spouse in the matter of interment or reinterment 
unquestionably is founded upon the relationship between husband and wife as the 
closest family tie.”). 
 85. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 231. 
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the decedent, followed by the surviving parents, adult siblings, and 
finally, remaining next of kin.86 
B. The Current State of Disposition of Remains Statutes  
Recently, states have begun amending their statutes to depart 
from the traditional disposition of remains regime. For example, 
several states now classify the right of domestic partners or civil 
union partners on the same level as spouses.87 Many states also 
allow a person to leave instructions or designate an agent to control 
the disposition of his or her remains, whether or not this person is a 
family member.88 Furthermore, several statutes now include 
forfeiture provisions when there is a pending divorce, legal 
separation, estrangement, or if a protective order has been issued 
against the person vested with the right of disposition.89 Importantly, 
some states have amended their disposition of remains statutes to 
provide for forfeiture if the person vested with the right of 
disposition is criminally responsible for the decedent’s death,90 
although many still have not. 
                                                                                                             
 86. See, e.g., 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.09 (Westlaw 2013); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2108.81 (Westlaw 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-19-904 (Westlaw 2013). 
 87. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-509 (Westlaw 2013); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-33.2-24 (Westlaw 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5227 
(Westlaw 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (Westlaw 2013). For a 
detailed discussion of the outdated family paradigm and its application to the 
disposition of remains, see Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes 
Over Dead Bodies, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008). 
 88. Hernández, supra note 58, at 1026–27. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-
1142 (Westlaw 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1158 (Westlaw 2013); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002 (West 2010). 
 89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (Westlaw 2013) (vesting right of 
disposition in surviving spouse unless petition to dissolve marriage was pending at 
the time of death or if a judge determines the deceased and the spouse were 
estranged); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (Westlaw 2013) (vesting right in 
surviving spouse except when a petition to dissolve marriage or for legal 
separation is pending or if the court determines the decedent and spouse were 
physically and emotionally separated at the time of death); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
45:27-22 (Westlaw 2013) (vesting right in surviving spouse or surviving civil 
union or domestic partner unless the decedent had a temporary or permanent 
restraining order issued against him or her); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 
(McKinney 2013) (vesting right in surviving spouse unless the person was subject 
to an order of protection at the time of the decedent’s death). 
 90. See infra note 137. 
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1. States Without Forfeiture Provisions  
Nearly half of states do not have provisions within their 
disposition of remains statutes calling for forfeiture when an 
individual granted the right of disposition is, in fact, the person who 
killed the victim.91 Although some may grant a decedent’s next of 
kin standing to bring a dispute in court,92 most states without 
forfeiture provisions do not provide any avenue for the family to 
                                                                                                             
 91. The following jurisdictions do not currently have forfeiture provisions: 
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-318 (West, Westlaw through 2013 
Jan. Reg. Sess.) (proposed amendment in 2013); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, §§ 264, 268–269 (West 2006); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE §§ 3-413 to 3-
413.01 (Westlaw 2013); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1734 (Westlaw 2013); 
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 213.420, 367.97501, 367.97527 (Westlaw 
2013); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:655 (2005), id. § 37:876 (2007); 
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-509, 5-511 (Westlaw 2013), MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 7-410 (Westlaw 2013); Massachusetts, 239 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 3.09 (Westlaw 2013), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 38, § 13 (West, 
Westlaw through ch. 83 of 2013 1st Ann. Sess.) (proposed amendment in 2013); 
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.3206, 700.3208 (Westlaw 2013); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.80 (Westlaw 2013); Mississippi, MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 73-11-58 (West 2010); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 194.119 
(Westlaw 2013); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1425 (Westlaw 2013) 
(proposed amendment in 2013); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 451.023–
451.024 (Westlaw 2013); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-12A-1 to 24-12A-
2, 61-32-19 (Westlaw 2013); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-
210.124, 130A-420 (Westlaw 2013); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 
23-06-03, 26-06-31 (Westlaw 2013); Pennsylvania, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
305 (Westlaw 2013); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-33.2-24, 5-33.3-3 
(Westlaw 2013); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-570, 32-8-315, 32-8-
320, 40-19-280 (Westlaw 2013); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-26-1, 
34-26-16 to 34-26-17, 34-26A-2 (Westlaw 2013); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
54.1-2800, 54.1-2807 to 54.1-2807.01, 54.1-2825, 54.1-2973 (Westlaw 2013); 
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-17-101 (Westlaw 2013). 
 92. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.420 (“In the event that a homicide has 
been committed and the person charged . . . refuses to permit the burial of the . . . 
victim of his or her alleged homicide, any member of the family of the deceased . . . 
may apply to [the court] for an order to release the body of the deceased [for 
disposition].”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-511 (“An individual may file a 
petition with the appropriate court to obtain the authority to be authorizing agent” if 
he alleges that permitting the person to have authority “may cause substantial 
injustice” or if the individual “had a closer personal affinity to the decedent and 
should be allowed to make the arrangements.”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305 
(allowing the filing of “a petition alleging enduring estrangement, incompetence, 
contrary intent or waiver and agreement”); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2807.01 (“In 
the absence of a designation . . . when there is a disagreement among a decedent’s 
next of kin concerning the arrangements for his funeral or the disposition of his 
remains, any of the next of kin may petition the circuit court where the decedent 
resided at the time of his death to determine which of the next of kin shall have the 
authority to make arrangements for the decedent’s funeral or the disposition of his 
remains.”). 
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challenge the slayer’s authority and control over the victim’s body. 
An in-depth analysis of the disposition of remains statutes in a few 
of the states lacking explicit forfeiture provisions reveals how some 
states leave open the possibility of slayers retaining the right to 
control the disposition of their victims’ remains.93 
a. Louisiana 
Over the past 15 years, Louisiana has consistently suffered from 
a high rate of homicides involving one female victim and one male 
offender.94 Despite its high domestic homicide rate,95 Louisiana 
does not have a forfeiture provision within its disposition of remains 
statute. Unlike Louisiana’s slayer statute, which follows the civil 
law doctrine of “unworthiness,”96 Louisiana’s disposition of remains 
statute recognizes the quasi-property right of possession applied by 
most common law states.97 The statute allows for a person to leave 
specific directions in the form of a written and notarized 
                                                                                                             
 93. The five states whose statutory regimes are analyzed in this Comment 
were ranked by the Violence Policy Center (VPC) in the top ten states for highest 
female-victim and male-offender homicide rates in 2010. This statistic is often 
used to analyze domestic homicide rates. VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, WHEN MEN 
MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 6–7 (2012), available at 
http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf. As of the writing of this Comment, no 
published decisions have addressed the ambiguities present in state laws relating to 
the disposition of remains and forfeiture. However, this should not be any indication 
of the relevance or importance of forfeiture provisions and well-written disposition 
of remains statutes. Court orders determining who has the right of disposition are 
unlikely to be reported. Further, appeals are impractical in many cases given the 
timing of disposition decisions. 
 94. The female-victim and male-offender homicide rate statistic is often used 
to analyze domestic homicide rates. VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, WHEN MEN 
MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 6–7 (2012), available 
at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf. Louisiana has ranked in the top 
five of the VPC’s annual report 14 out of the past 15 years. See When Men Murder 
Women, VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/wmmw.htm (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2013). 
 95. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text; see also Nevada Ranks #1 
in Rate of Women Murdered by Men for Third Year in a Row According to VPC 
Study Released Annually for Domestic Violence Awareness Month in October, 
VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.vpc.org/press/1209wmmw 
.htm (stating that VPC’s study is “released each year to coincide with Domestic 
Violence Awareness Month”). 
 96. See supra notes 35, 51 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (“After 
considering the relevant Louisiana statutory and case law regarding the rights of 
next of kin in the body of a deceased relative, we conclude that Louisiana has 
indeed established a ‘quasi-property’ right of survivors in the remains of their 
deceased relatives.”). 
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declaration.98 Unless this is done, the right to control interment99 or 
cremation100 vests first in the surviving spouse, so long as no 
petition for divorce is pending.101 If no surviving spouse exists or a 
petition for divorce is filed, the right devolves to the surviving adult 
children and continues down the list of next of kin.102 As currently 
written, Louisiana’s statute leaves open the possibility that the 
person granted the right of disposition is the slayer who took the 
decedent’s life. 
b. Nevada 
Nevada has likewise led the nation in the rate of female-victim 
and male-offender homicides, ranking first for the past three years.103 
Despite holding this rank for five of the past six years104 and having a 
rate more than twice the national average,105 Nevada has yet to 
include a forfeiture provision within its disposition of remains statute. 
In Nevada, a person may authorize another to make his or her burial 
arrangements through a legally valid document or in an affidavit.106 If 
no such person has been designated, that right then vests in the 
surviving spouse and continues down the order of next of kin.107 
However, the statute does not take away the right of disposition if the 
designated agent, surviving spouse, or next of kin is criminally 
responsible for the person’s death.108 
                                                                                                             
 98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:655 (2005). 
 99. “‘Interment’ means the disposition of human remains by inurnment, 
scattering, entombment, or burial in a place used or intended to be used, and 
dedicated, for cemetery purposes.” Id. § 8:1. 
 100. Louisiana has a separate statute governing cremation. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 37:876 (2007). 
 101. § 8:655; § 37:876. 
 102. § 37:876. 
 103. Nevada Ranks #1 in Rate of Women Murdered by Men for Third Year in a 
Row According to VPC Study Released Annually for Domestic Violence 
Awareness Month in October, VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 19, 2012), http: 
//www.vpc.org/press/1209wmmw.htm. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The national rate in 2010 was 1.22 per 100,000. In Nevada, this rate was 
2.62 per 100,000. VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 5–6 (2012), available at http://www.vpc 
.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf. 
 106. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.024 (Westlaw 2013). 
 107. Id.  
 108. If the decedent was a member of the armed forces, either active duty or 
reserve, at the time of death, a person designated on the emergency data form as 
the person authorized to direct disposition would have priority before the spouse. 
Id. 
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c. New Mexico 
New Mexico’s statutes relating to the disposition of remains are 
located under its Cremation and Thanatopractice109 regulations. 
There are two sections under the Cremation regulations, one labeled 
“No written instructions; priority of others to decide disposition”110 
and the other labeled “Right to authorize cremation; definitions.”111 
To make matters more confusing, there is a section in the 
Thanatopractice regulations entitled “Cremation; requirements; right 
to authorize cremation; disposition of cremains,” which combines 
the language of both sections.112 
Both sections 24-12A-2 and 61-32-19 describe the priority of 
persons who can decide disposition if no written instructions are left 
by the decedent. The first person listed in both statutes is the 
surviving spouse, followed by the next of kin.113 While these 
statutes seemingly relate only to cremation (one located among 
cremation regulations and the other entitled “Cremation”), the 
statutory language indicates that the right of disposition is not 
limited to cremation but extends to other means of disposition as 
well.114 
In addition, sections 24-12A-1 and 61-32-19 contain provisions 
stating that one “may authorize [one’s] own cremation and the 
lawful disposition of [one’s] cremains by: (1) stating [one’s] desire 
to be cremated in a written statement that is signed by the 
[declarant] and notarized or witnessed by two other persons; or (2) 
including an express statement in [one’s] will.”115 But it is unclear 
from these sections whether this same form requirement would be 
necessary if the desired means of disposition is not cremation. 
Furthermore, the second method of authorization, an express 
statement in a will, may not be effective.116 Often a will is not 
located until after disposition arrangements have taken place,117 or 
“survivors [may] not consult the contents of a will until after the 
decedent has been buried, thereby obviating any formal 
                                                                                                             
 109. Thanatopractice relates to the “handling and care of the dead and the 
sensitivities of those who survive.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-32-2 (West 2013). 
 110. Id. § 24-12A-2. 
 111. Id. § 24-12A-1. 
 112. Id. § 61-32-19. 
 113. § 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19. 
 114. “[T]he following persons in the order listed shall determine the means of 
disposition, not to be limited to cremation, of the remains of the decedent . . . .”     
§ 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19 (emphasis added). 
 115. § 24-12A-1, § 61-32-19. 
 116. See Kester, supra note 20, at 585; Hernández, supra note 58, at 1020. 
 117. Kester, supra note 20, at 585. 
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consideration of the decedent’s . . . wishes stated in the will.”118 
However, it is clear from the sections that when no instructions are 
left, the default order of priority will be used, regardless of whether 
the right holder is responsible for the decedent’s death.119 
d. South Carolina 
Not only do the disposition of remains statutes in South Carolina 
lack forfeiture provisions, but they are also poorly constructed and 
unclear. First, laws governing disposition rights in South Carolina 
are not contained within a single statute. Under the regulations for 
embalmers and funeral directors, one statute provides that a public 
officer or “any other person having a professional relationship with 
the decedent” may not send remains to a funeral establishment 
“without having first made due inquiry as to the desires of the next 
of kin . . . . If any kin is found, authority and directions of the kin 
govern except in those instances where the deceased made prior 
arrangements in writing.”120 However, there is neither a definition of 
next of kin nor an order of priority as to who would make such 
decisions. Under the statutes governing the duties of coroners and 
medical examiners, one section provides that “[a]fter the post-
mortem examination, autopsy, or inquest has been completed, the 
dead body must be released to the person lawfully entitled to it for 
burial,” indicating that there is one person in control—but the 
statutes lack a description of who has the ultimate authority.121 
Although South Carolina does not have a statute providing a 
clear order and priority of persons with the right of disposition, 
South Carolina courts have followed the common law rule that the 
right vests first in the surviving spouse, then in the next of kin.122 
Additionally, South Carolina recently amended its cremation 
authorization statute to provide that in the absence of a preneed 
cremation authorization in which a decedent specifies the final 
disposition of his or her cremated remains, there is an order of 
priority of persons who may authorize cremation.123 The right first 
devolves upon a “person designated as agent for this purpose by the 
                                                                                                             
 118. Hernández, supra note 58, at 1020. 
 119. § 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19 (“not to be limited to cremation”). 
 120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-19-280 (Westlaw 2013). 
 121. Id. § 17-5-570. 
 122. C. CRAIG YOUNG ET AL., DEAD BODIES § 9, in 6 SOUTH CAROLINA 
JURISPRUDENCE (Westlaw 2013) (citing Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
20 S.E.2d 733 (1942) (“determining that a surviving spouse has primary right to 
possession of a dead body and to control disposition thereof, unless the decedent 
has by will or other expression made a different disposition”)). 
 123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-8-320b (Westlaw 2013). 
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decedent in a will or other verified and attested document” and if 
none exists, then upon “the spouse of the decedent.”124 The statute 
continues to list the next of kin in order of priority: adult children, 
surviving parents, adult siblings, adult grandchildren, grandparents, 
and so on.125 While the South Carolina statutes are far from clear, 
the same order of priority as listed in the cremation authorization 
statute would likely also be used to establish the person in charge of 
determining the general method of disposition, whether or not that 
person killed the decedent. 
e. Virginia 
Virginia’s disposition of remains statutes are simultaneously 
complicated and unique. In the chapter of the Virginia Code entitled 
“Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers,” “next of kin” is 
defined as “any of the following persons, regardless of the 
relationship to the decedent: [any designated agent], the legal 
spouse, child over 18 years of age, custodial parent, noncustodial 
parent, siblings . . . or any other relative in the descending order of 
blood relationship.”126 A separate statute then provides that “[t]he 
authority and directions of any next of kin shall govern the disposal 
of the [decedent’s] body, subject to the provisions of [the section 
governing disagreements of next of kin] or [the section governing 
the designation of an individual to make final arrangements].”127 
It is important to note the statutes’ uses of the word “any”—
Virginia is the only state to statutorily define the relatives who 
qualify as next of kin and grant them authority to control the 
disposition of remains but not provide any order of priority among 
the relatives.128 Although a designated agent has the ultimate 
authority over any next of kin, no priority exists among the 
decedent’s spouse and relatives with respect to the right to control 
disposition.129 The General Assembly of Virginia elected not to use 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2800 (Westlaw 2013) (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. § 54.1-2807 (emphasis added) (referencing id. §§ 54.1-2807.01, 54.1-
2825). 
 128. However, there is an order and priority of persons who may authorize 
postmortem examination of a decedent’s body. Id. § 54.1-2973. 
 129. Id. § 54.1-2825 (“Any person may designate in a signed and notarized 
writing, which has been accepted in writing by the person so designated, an 
individual who shall make arrangements and be otherwise responsible for his 
funeral and the disposition of his remains . . . upon his death. Such designee shall 
have priority over all persons otherwise entitled to make such arrangements, 
provided that a copy of the signed and notarized writing is provided to the funeral 
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“a sequential hierarchy of relatives” but rather to keep the rights of 
the next of kin “broad and coequal.”130 One purpose of having a 
broad class of individuals is so that a body can be disposed of in an 
expeditious manner “without resort to the difficult and often 
confusing task of sequentially determining who within a blood line 
is entitled to claim the body that requires immediate attention.”131 
However, Virginia acknowledges that disagreements may arise 
among the next of kin since the rights of the relatives are coequal; 
section 54.1-2807.01 states that in the absence of a designation, any 
relative may petition the court to “determine which of the next of 
kin shall have the authority to make arrangements for the decedent’s 
funeral or the disposition of his remains.”132 The court must 
consider a list of factors in determining who should be authorized to 
make the decisions, including “the expressed wishes, if any, of the 
decedent, the legal and factual relationship between or among the 
disputing next of kin and between each of the disputing next of kin 
and the decedent, and any other factor the court considers 
relevant.”133 
Though the statute does allow the next of kin to petition the 
court when disposition disputes arise, a slayer would still technically 
have a coequal right of disposition because forfeiture is not 
automatic. Furthermore, the language in the statute relating to 
disputes leaves open the possibility that a designated person could 
kill the victim and still have ultimate control over his or her 
disposition, without the family’s ability to challenge.134 This is 
because a designated agent has priority over all next of kin,135 and 
the statute relating to disputes only allows family members to 
petition the court “[i]n the absence of a designation.”136 
2. States with Forfeiture Provisions 
Although many state statutes currently do not provide for 
forfeiture, there has been legislative progress toward divesting 
slayers of disposition rights; presently, 28 states have some version 
                                                                                                             
 
service establishment and to the cemetery, if any, no later than 48 hours after the 
funeral service establishment has received the remains.” (emphasis added)).  
 130. Siver v. Rockingham Mem’l Hosp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12 (W.D. 
Va. 1999). 
 131. Id. at 611. 
 132. § 54.1-2807.01.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. § 54.1-2825. 
 136. § 54.1-2807.01. 
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of a forfeiture provision within their disposition of remains 
statutes.137 However, even among these statutes, there is wide 
variation. Some provisions only address situations in which the 
spouse is the killer, thereby not encompassing cases where another 
family member may be responsible for the death yet retains the right 
to control the disposition of the victim’s remains.138 Other 
provisions do not account for cases when the slayer may be 
designated as an agent for disposition.139 Additionally, most 
provisions only contemplate forfeiture when criminal charges have 
been brought against the slayer, not reaching instances when law 
enforcement cannot establish probable cause or make an arrest 
before disposition decisions are made.140 Lastly, most statutes do not 
allow a person whose right has been forfeited the ability to challenge 
the presumption that the forfeiture is just.141 
                                                                                                             
 137. The following states have some form of a forfeiture provision: Alabama, 
ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (Westlaw 2013); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 
13.75.020, 13.75.060 (Westlaw 2013); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831 
(Westlaw 2013); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (Westlaw 2013); 
California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West 2007); Colorado, COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-19-106, 15-19-109 (Westlaw 2013); Florida, FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 497.005 (Westlaw 2013); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-21-7 (Westlaw 
2013); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ -4, -6 (Westlaw 2013) (Laws 2013, Act 17) 
(official classification pending); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1142 (Westlaw 
2013); Illinois, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 65/5, 65/20 (West 2007); Indiana, 
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (Westlaw 2013); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
144C.5, 144C.8 (Westlaw 2013); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A 
(Westlaw 2013); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-19-904, 37-19-906 (Westlaw 
2013); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 290:16–290:17 (Westlaw 2013); 
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22 (Westlaw 2013); New York, N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.77, 
2108.81 (Westlaw 2013); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1151a, 1158 
(Westlaw 2013); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97.130 (Westlaw 2013); 
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-703 to 62-5-704 (Westlaw 2013); Texas, 
TEX. HEATH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002 (West 2010), TEX. PROB. CODE 
ANN. § 115 (West 2003) (repealed and recodified as TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 
152.101–152.102 effective Jan. 1, 2014); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-9-602 to 
58-9-603 (Westlaw 2013); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5227–5228 
(Westlaw 2013); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (Westlaw 
2013); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-6-22a (Westlaw 2013); Wisconsin, 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.30 (Westlaw 2013). 
 138. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 139. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 140. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 141. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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a. Limitations in the Reach of Forfeiture Provisions 
The forfeiture provisions in some state statutes are drafted so as 
to only apply to certain categories of persons granted the right of 
disposition. For example, the disposition of remains statutes in 
Florida and New Jersey call for forfeiture only in the case of spousal 
murder. Florida’s statute provides: 
(39) “Legally authorized person” means, in the priority 
listed: 
(a) The decedent, when written inter vivos 
authorizations and directions are provided by the 
decedent; 
(b) [The person designed in a DD Form 93 as agent if 
the deceased was a member of the Armed Forces, 
Reserves, or National Guard when he or she died]; 
(c) The surviving spouse, unless the spouse has been 
arrested for committing against the deceased an 
act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 
that resulted in or contributed to the death of the 
deceased;142 
The rest of the next of kin follow, but there is no provision relating 
to forfeiture in cases where a family member other than the spouse 
is responsible for the victim’s death. 
New Jersey’s forfeiture provision is likewise limited to spousal 
disposition rights as a result of the provision’s placement. The 
statute first provides that a decedent may appoint a person in a will 
to control the disposition of remains.143 However, if no appointment 
has been made and unless other directions have been given by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, the right shall go to: 
(1) The surviving spouse of the decedent or the surviving 
civil union or domestic partner; except that if the 
decedent had a temporary or permanent restraining 
order issued . . . against the surviving spouse or civil 
union or domestic partner, or the surviving spouse or 
civil union or domestic partner is charged with the 
intentional killing of the decedent, the right to control 
the funeral and disposition of the remains shall be 
granted to the next available priority class as provided 
in this subsection.144 
                                                                                                             
 142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005 (emphasis added). 
 143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22 (Westlaw 2013). 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
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This limitation appears to be the result of oversight on the part of the 
Legislature, as there is no justifiable reason to call for forfeiture only 
in the case of spousal killings but not other familial homicides.  
Moreover, the ill-considered placement of the forfeiture provision 
in several statutes creates another limitation: The provision does not 
take away rights if the victim specifically designated the slayer as an 
agent to control disposition. For example, New Jersey’s statute 
provides first that if a decedent appoints a person to control 
disposition, the designee shall have priority over all other persons 
upon the decedent’s death.145 The default order is applicable only if 
no designation is made. However, the only provision providing for 
forfeiture is listed within the default order.146 Consequently, the 
forfeiture provision does not apply when a person appointed to 
control disposition is the person who killed the decedent. This holds 
true for Florida’s forfeiture provision as well.147 It is unlikely that 
the state legislatures intended to create this loophole that allows a 
slayer to retain the right to dispose of his or her victim’s remains if 
the victim previously designated the slayer to act as his or her agent 
for disposition. 
Iowa’s forfeiture provision, in contrast, only calls for forfeiture 
of a designee’s authority and does not extend to rights granted to a 
person when no designation is made.148 It provides: “A designee 
shall forfeit all rights and authority under a declaration . . . [if] [t]he 
designee is charged with murder in the first or second degree or 
voluntary manslaughter in connection with the declarant’s death and 
those charges are known to a third party.”149 Thus, family members 
granted the power of disposition by law rather than by specific 
designation are not subject to forfeiture of their rights.150 While 
Iowa’s provision remedies the defect present in Florida and New 
Jersey’s statutes, it has the effect, again likely unintentional, of not 
reaching slayers granted the right of disposition by statute rather 
than by designation. 
Another drafting choice that limits the impact of current 
forfeiture provisions is that most state statutes require a person to be 
charged with an offense relating to the death before forfeiture takes 
place,151 though some states extend the application of forfeiture 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005. 
 148. IOWA CODE ANN. § 144C.8 (Westlaw 2013). 
 149. Id. (emphasis added). 
 150. Id. § 144C.5. 
 151. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-603 (Westlaw 2013); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 30-6-22a (Westlaw 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.30 (Westlaw 2013). 
Tennessee’s forfeiture provision even requires a person be convicted before 
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provisions to persons arrested in connection with the death.152 
However, these statutes do not address situations in which a suspect 
is on the run and not yet arrested or charged, or when there is good 
cause to believe a person was involved in the killing but not yet 
enough evidence to establish probable cause for an arrest. While an 
arrest or charge provides additional assurance that the forfeiture is 
justified, the forfeiture provisions of most states do not reach 
individuals believed to be involved or responsible for the death who 
have not yet been arrested or charged, which is problematic because 
disposition decisions must be made shortly after the death.153 
To address this situation one state, Vermont, goes so far as to 
require forfeiture if the right holder is a person of interest and likely 
to be prosecuted in connection with the decedent’s death.154 For 
example, in the case of Stephen Shepherd, he was labeled a person 
of interest and likely to be prosecuted during the time he was in 
hiding before his arrest.155 In such situations, most forfeiture 
provisions would still permit suspected slayers to retain the right to 
dispose of their victims until the slayer has been formally charged. 
While Vermont expanded the coverage of its forfeiture provision by 
including “person of interest and likely to be prosecuted,” this 
language could become problematic because the phrase “person of 
                                                                                                             
 
forfeiture takes place. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-704 (Westlaw 2013). See also 
infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 152. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 290:17 (Westlaw 2013); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 97.130 (Westlaw 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 
(Westlaw 2013). 
 153. If not quickly buried or cremated, bodies will begin to decompose. If there 
is a dispute, many state statutes authorize the funeral director to embalm or 
refrigerate the body during the proceedings. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
102 (Westlaw 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-602 (Westlaw 2013). Such delay is 
not only costly, with storage fees ranging from $35–$100 per day, Funeral Costs – 
a detailed price breakdown, THE FUNERAL SITE, http://www.thefuneralsite.com 
/ResourceCenters/Costs/How_much.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012), but it also 
prolongs the emotional distress of the kin during such litigation and ultimately 
keeps the victim from his or her final resting place. See Kester, supra note 20, at 
588–89 (describing a case in which a body remained in storage for over five years 
while next of kin disputed in court); see also infra notes 205–06 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5228 (Westlaw 2013). 
 155. See T.J. Pignataro & Jay Rey, Husband Sought in Tonawanda Death: 
Town Police Suspect Homicide After Wife’s Body is Found in House, The 
BUFFALO NEWS, May 21, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9723003; Gene Warner 
& T.J. Pignataro, Husband Arrested in Tonawanda Slaying: Found in Catskills 
After a Nationwide Alert, Will be Charged with Murder, Town Police Say, THE 
BUFFALO NEWS, May 22, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9795915. 
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interest” is not a formally defined term.156 However, if forfeiture 
provisions only affect persons charged or arrested, suspected slayers 
may still be granted the right to control the disposition of their 
victims’ remains, with their families having no recourse to challenge 
the authority. 
b. Lack of Due Process Considerations 
Although many states have automatic forfeiture provisions 
within their disposition of remains statutes, few grant notice of the 
forfeiture and an opportunity to challenge the presumption in a 
meaningful and timely manner to an individual who has forfeited the 
right of disposition. The absence of procedure to challenge the 
forfeiture may constitute a due process violation, as disposition of 
remains statutes grant a bundle of rights to the next of kin of 
decedents.157 Though the right to dispose of remains is not a 
traditional property right, this statutory entitlement may rise to the 
level of a constitutionally protected interest.158 
The New York State Legislature considered the possibility that 
an alleged slayer may be wrongfully accused when it amended New 
York’s disposition of remains law in 2012.159 As a result, the 
Legislature included a provision allowing courts to waive the 
application of forfeiture in certain instances.160 The statute provides 
that the application of the forfeiture provision “may be waived . . . in 
the interest of justice by order of . . . the court . . . in which the 
criminal action . . . is pending . . . [or] if proceeding in that court 
would cause inappropriate delay, a court in a special proceeding.”161 
However, the statute provides little guidance as to when such waiver 
may be appropriate or if a person must receive notice of the 
forfeiture and the ability to challenge the deprivation. New York has 
at least considered the procedural concerns when depriving a person 
of a statutorily granted right; in contrast, most state statutes do not 
contemplate this matter. 
                                                                                                             
 156. Dan Fletcher, What’s a ‘Person of Interest’?, TIME (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1924318,00.html. See also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1257 (A person of interest is “[a] person who is 
the subject of a police investigation but who has not been identified by investigators 
as being suspected of committing the crime itself.”). 
 157. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 158. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 159. See Video: Press Conference on Legislation to Protect Remains of Crime 
Victims (NY SENATE 2012), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/video/2012 
/may/15/video-press-conference-legislation-protect-remains-crime-victims. 
 160. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013). 
 161. Id. The statute also gives the ability to challenge the forfeiture to a person 
who has forfeited the right due to an outstanding order of protection. Id. 
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III. GUIDANCE FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
The majority of state statutory regimes relating to the disposition 
of remains currently fail both victims and surviving family 
members, as they either do not call for forfeiture in the case of 
murder or do not have comprehensive forfeiture provisions. The 
maxim underlying the slayer rule that no man shall take advantage 
of his own wrong should prevent slayers from having the right to 
dispose of their victims’ remains, just as it does in the case of 
prohibiting the inheritance of property or life insurance benefits. The 
principles underlying the slayer rule also call for forfeiture of 
disposition rights. Morally, there is sanctity in life. Equitably, the 
slayer should not be granted a right by virtue of committing a crime. 
Legally, a slayer should not be permitted to control the disposition 
of a decedent’s remains by bringing about the death. Presumably a 
victim would not want the person who took his or her life to make 
important decisions regarding the victim’s final resting place. For 
these reasons, a slayer should and can be prevented from having the 
right to dispose of his or her victim’s remains.162 
Every state must ensure not only that slayers are divested of the 
right to control their victims’ final dispositions but also that families 
of victims are not deprived of this right. Making disposition 
arrangements is an integral part of the grieving process.163 Homicide 
already victimizes survivors; their “trust in the world, spirituality, 
and beliefs about social order and justice can be devastated.”164 
Furthermore, this process of making disposition and funeral 
arrangements often “assists survivors in coming to terms with the 
loss and their grief, particularly where the death was unexpected.”165 
When the victim’s family is deprived of this right and instead the 
slayer is granted control of the disposition, both the survivors and 
the decedent are victimized a second time. 
                                                                                                             
 162. A slayer may choose to vindictively inflict more pain on the survivors by 
refusing to relinquish the body to the family and making decisions contrary to the 
victim’s wishes. See, e.g., Video: Press Conference on Legislation to Protect 
Remains of Crime Victims (NY SENATE 2012), available at http://www.nysenate 
.gov/video/2012/may/15/video-press-conference-legislation-protect-remains-crime 
-victims. 
 163. Hernández, supra note 58, at 991–92. 
 164. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIRST RESPONSE 
TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 53 
(2010), available at http://www.ovc.gov/publications/infores/pdftxt/2010First 
ResponseGuidebook.pdf. 
 165. Hernández, supra note 58, at 991. 
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A. Determining the Proper Scope of Forfeiture Provisions 
To protect victims’ families and to keep such personal matters 
out of the hands of slayers, every state should extend the reasoning 
behind the slayer rule to provide for forfeiture of slayers’ rights to 
dispose of their victims’ remains.166 But it is not enough that a 
disposition of remains statute contain a forfeiture provision. While 
the language and coverage of statutes may vary by state, the 
following fundamental requirements should be considered: (1) a 
clear order and priority of all persons who may be vested with the 
right to control disposition, whether by designation or by law; (2) an 
effective forfeiture provision that is triggered when any person 
granted the right is a suspect likely to be prosecuted, arrested, or 
charged with murder or voluntary manslaughter; and (3) a 
requirement that a person deprived of the right be afforded notice 
and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the forfeiture. 
1. Ensuring All Potential Right Holders Are Subject to 
Forfeiture 
When discussing familial homicides, spousal homicides are 
often the first category that comes to mind. The disposition of 
remains statutes in Florida and New Jersey are evidence of this, as 
their forfeiture clauses apply only to spouses, not other family 
members.167 However, 12% of homicide victims are killed by other 
family members.168 Thus, a family member may be criminally 
responsible for a decedent’s death and yet still be vested with the 
right to control the disposition of the decedent’s remains, for 
example, if the victim is unmarried or divorced. Consequently, 
forfeiture provisions must be positioned within disposition of 
remains statutes so as to affect all persons with the authority to 
control disposition, whether a spouse or any other person granted 
the right of disposition. States can easily ensure forfeiture provisions 
are applicable to all categories of potential right holders by first 
listing a clear order and priority of persons entitled to the right of 
                                                                                                             
 166. This Comment focuses on the need for forfeiture in instances when the 
person granted the right of disposition is criminally responsible for the decedent’s 
death. However, many states choose to require forfeiture in other instances as well, 
for example, if there is an outstanding order of protection against an individual at 
the time of the decedent’s death or if an individual vested with the right declines to 
act, is unable to act, does not act within a certain time period, or cannot be found. 
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2108.75 (Westlaw 2013). 
 167. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 168. Cooper, supra note 22, at 16. 
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disposition, then calling for forfeiture in the case of anyone vested 
with the right by virtue of the statute.169 
For example, Indiana’s disposition of remains statute states: 
“Except as provided in subsection (b), the following persons, in the 
order of priority indicated, have the authority to designate the 
manner, type, and selection of the final disposition of human 
remains.”170 After listing designated agents and all next of kin, 
subsection (b) then contains the statute’s forfeiture provision.171 By 
drafting the statute in this manner, Indiana avoided the flaw present 
in Florida’s and New Jersey’s statutes: The forfeiture provision is 
applicable to any person who is granted the right of disposition, not 
just a spouse. 
In addition to affecting all persons granted the right of 
disposition through the default order of priority, forfeiture 
provisions must also apply to right holders designated as agents for 
disposition. Presumably a victim would not want a person who 
brought about his or her death to control the disposition of the 
victim’s remains, even if that person was previously designated as 
an agent to determine disposition, a power of attorney, or a designee 
to carry out the decedent’s wishes. For this reason, forfeiture 
provisions should be crafted and positioned so that they divest 
slayers of the right to control disposition, no matter how or when 
such right is vested. By comprehensively covering all ways by 
which disposition rights can be vested, a forfeiture provision will 
effectively prevent slayers from controlling the disposition of their 
victims’ remains.172 
The forfeiture provision in the Arkansas Final Disposition 
Rights Act of 2009 successfully applies to anyone granted the right 
of disposition, including designated agents. Under section (d)(1), the 
Act covers the order and priority of all persons who could 
potentially be vested with the right to control disposition, whether 
appointed by the decedent or granted the right by the default 
statutory order.173 Then, section (e)(1) contains the forfeiture 
provision, which provides: “A person entitled under this section to 
the right of disposition shall forfeit that right” in certain instances, 
including murder.174 Because the Act addresses all ways by which 
disposition rights can be bestowed and applies to all manners of 
disposition, the forfeiture provision within the Arkansas Final 
                                                                                                             
 169. See, e.g., Appendix subsections (B)–(C). 
 170. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (Westlaw 2013) (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Appendix subsections (B)–(C). 
 173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (Westlaw 2013). 
 174. Id. 
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Disposition Rights Act of 2009 effectively divests slayers of 
disposition rights in any potential scenario.175 
In reforming their laws, state legislatures should take care to 
make sure forfeiture provisions affect all relevant statutes. Often, 
statutes concerning the designation of an agent are distinct from 
general disposition of remains statutes.176 Accordingly, every 
applicable statute relating to disposition should reflect a forfeiture 
provision in order to ensure that the law is consistent and slayers are 
not granted disposition rights as a result of drafting oversight and 
conflicting statutes.177 
2. Establishing When Forfeiture Should Take Place 
Of the state statutes containing forfeiture provisions, most provide 
for forfeiture in the case of murder and voluntary manslaughter.178 
When drafting the forfeiture provision, states may look to their 
respective slayer statutes for guidance as to which grounds should 
necessitate forfeiture. The nomenclature of specific crimes varies by 
state179 as does the list of offenses encompassed within slayer 
statutes;180 thus, a state’s forfeiture provision language should mirror 
that of its slayer statute. 
But unlike the application of slayer statutes and the resulting 
deprivation of property that can take place after a trial or a civil 
determination,181 disposition decisions must be made soon after the 
                                                                                                             
 175. Id. 
 176. This also holds true for statutes relating to anatomical gifts, preneed funeral 
or cremation contracts, duties of burial, authorization for cremation, declaration of 
instructions in a will or otherwise, and also designation of an agent for disposition of 
remains. See, e.g., Jonathan Spralding Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-6B (Westlaw 2013); Id. § 24-12A-1 (“Right to authorize 
cremation; definition”); Id. § 24-12A-2 (“No written instructions; priority of others 
to decide disposition”); Id. § 45-3-701 (“Time of accrual of duties and powers”); Id. 
§ 61-32-19 (“Cremation; requirements; right to authorize cremation; disposition of 
cremains”). 
 177. For example, a state’s statute relating to burial rights may provide for 
forfeiture while the statute relating to cremation authorization does not. 
 178. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 144C.8 (Westlaw 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-9-603 (Westlaw 2013). 
 179. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-603 (“voluntary manslaughter”); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-19-906 (Westlaw 2013) (“deliberate or negligent 
homicide”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (Westlaw 2013) (“first degree 
manslaughter”). 
 180. For example, some states extend forfeiture to include non-felonious 
homicides. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
45 (2011). 
 181. Id. 
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commission of the crime.182 Thus, the forfeiture provision must 
specify when the forfeiture is triggered, as final arrangements 
ordinarily take place prior to the determination of criminal guilt.183 
Most of the currently enacted forfeiture provisions require a person 
to either be arrested or charged before forfeiture takes place.184 
However, states should expand their forfeiture provisions to include 
a suspect likely to be prosecuted in connection with the death.185 
Both the timing of disposition decisions and the potential delays 
involved in building a case to file charges justify such an extension. 
As opposed to the term “person of interest,” “suspect” is formally 
defined, so there would be less ambiguity surrounding when 
forfeiture would apply.186 By crafting forfeiture provisions to reach 
suspects likely to be prosecuted as well as those arrested or charged 
with murder or voluntary manslaughter, disposition rights will be 
kept out of the hands of those believed to be involved or responsible 
for the death, even if not yet arrested187 or under prosecution.188 
                                                                                                             
 182. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 183. Tennessee’s forfeiture provision currently requires a person be convicted 
of an offense in connection with the decedent’s death before forfeiture takes place. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-704 (Westlaw 2013). However, disposition decisions 
are generally made soon after death. Accordingly, such a provision may result in 
either extensive delays in the disposition due to prolonged criminal proceedings or 
in alleged slayers controlling the disposition of their victims’ remains before being 
convicted. 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 185. A suspect is “[a] person believed to have committed a crime or offense.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1584. The statute must also require 
that a suspect who has forfeited the right of disposition receive notice of the 
forfeiture and have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the forfeiture. See 
discussion infra Part III.B. 
 186. Fletcher, supra note 156. 
 187. For example, in Texas the right of disposition is automatically forfeited if 
“an indictment has been filed charging the person with a crime . . . that involves 
family violence against the decedent.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
711.002 (West 2010). However, Texas has another statute that provides that “[t]he 
executor of a decedent’s will or the decedent’s next of kin may file an application 
for an order limiting the right of the decedent’s surviving spouse to control the 
decedent’s burial or cremation.” TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 152.101 (Westlaw 2013) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2014). 
If the court finds that there is good cause to believe that the decedent’s 
surviving spouse is the principal or an accomplice in a willful act that 
resulted in the decedent’s death, the court may, after notice and a hearing, 
limit the surviving spouse’s right to control the decedent’s burial or 
cremation. 
Id. § 152.102 (effective Jan. 1, 2014). The currently enacted law is substantively 
identical. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 115 (West 2003) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 
2014). 
 188. Most forfeiture provisions also require that the status of the investigation, 
arrest, or prosecution be known to the funeral service or crematory practitioner in 
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B. Safeguarding Due Process Rights 
Just as the rights of victims and families are of high importance, 
so too are the rights of the accused. An alleged slayer should have 
the ability to challenge the forfeiture of the right of disposition, not 
only for policy reasons because a conviction has not yet taken place 
but also to satisfy procedural due process concerns that are likely 
implicated when depriving a person of the right of disposition.189 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”190 While bodies are not 
                                                                                                             
 
order to protect practitioners from liability. In practice, after the medical examiner 
determines the cause and manner of death, the victim’s family is contacted to 
determine what arrangements should be made. Telephone Interview with Bobby 
Ducote, Funeral Home Manager, Schoen Funeral Home (Oct. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter Decote Interview]. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 5-C:66 (Westlaw 2013) 
(“When a funeral director, next of kin, or designated agent is requested to take 
custody of a body, he or she shall first ascertain whether a pronouncing physician, 
pronouncing registered nurse, APRN, or a medical examiner has established the 
cause of death and released the body for final disposition.”). The body is then 
transferred from the morgue to the funeral establishment or crematory. During this 
process, communication takes place between the medical examiner, the family 
member who releases the body, and the practitioner; the cause and manner of 
death is communicated to the practitioner, as it must be listed on the death 
certificate. Decote Interview, supra. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.16 
(Westlaw 2013) (“Each death . . . shall be registered . . . by the funeral director or 
other person in charge of the final disposition of the remains. The funeral director . 
. . shall present the . . . death certificate to the attending physician of the decedent, 
the coroner, or the medical examiner, as appropriate for certification of the cause 
of death.”). 
 189. There are two general categories of due process: substantive due process 
and procedural due process. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1505 (Westlaw 
2013). Whereas substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with 
rights rooted in the concept of liberty, procedural due process “requires 
government action resulting in the deprivation of a liberty or property interest to 
be implemented in a fair manner.” Id. The central issue that arises with forfeiture 
provisions is whether there are constitutionally adequate procedures surrounding 
the deprivation, not whether the state has the power to deprive someone of the 
right of disposition. See id. §§ 1443–1444. Accordingly, this Comment addresses 
procedural due process instead of substantive due process.  
 190. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Forfeiture provisions in disposition of remains 
laws clearly constitute a deprivation under the color of state law since the 
deprivation is provided for by state statute. Thus, the remaining questions are 
whether forfeiture of the right of disposition qualifies as a deprivation of a 
protectable interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and, if so, 
“whether the state afforded constitutionally adequate process for the deprivation.” 
Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. 
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treated as property in the traditional sense, the next of kin are 
entitled to certain statutory rights in remains.191 Consequently, the 
issue at hand is whether the deprivation of a statutorily granted right 
of disposition in remains is an interest entitled to procedural due 
process protection.192 
Because property interests are created by state law and not by the 
Constitution, courts look to applicable state law to determine whether 
a property interest exists.193 However, “federal constitutional law 
determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate 
claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”194 Thus, 
the determination of whether the right of disposition is protected by 
the Due Process Clause does not depend on whether the state 
classifies the interest in remains as property, quasi-property, or not 
property,195 but “whether [the substance of] that interest rises to the 
level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the [D]ue 
[P]rocess [C]lause.”196 All states have disposition of remains 
statutes granting a bundle of rights in a decedent’s remains to the 
next of kin;197 therefore, states have created a statutory entitlement 
and legal interest that is likely protectable under the Constitution. 
Indeed, numerous courts have come to this same conclusion and 
                                                                                                             
 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). States must also ensure that any laws enacted are 
in compliance with state constitutions. 
 191. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 192. “‘Liberty’ and ‘property’ are broad and majestic terms. They are among 
the ‘[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from 
experience . . . .’” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 
337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Although it is conceivable 
that the right of disposition could constitute a liberty interest, this seeming 
difficulty of categorizing the right as a liberty or property interest can be avoided 
for the purposes of this Comment, as both are entitled to procedural due process 
protections. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444 (Westlaw 2013) (“When a state 
action threatens to deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest, a 
person is entitled to procedural due process.”). 
 193. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 (“Property interests, of course, are not created by 
the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law . . . .”). 
 194. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing 
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)). 
 195. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
the identification of property interests for due process purposes turns on the 
substance of the interest recognized, not the name given to that interest by the 
state). 
 196. Id. at 481–82 (quoting Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 9). 
 197. See supra notes 91, 137. 
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have found that the right of disposition is a constitutionally 
protected interest.198 
In order to avoid potential due process violations, states should 
provide an avenue to ensure that the deprivation is executed in a fair 
manner.199 Due process is a flexible concept that differs depending 
on a particular situation,200 but “[t]he fundamental requirement of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner.’”201 The Supreme Court has consistently 
“held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is 
finally deprived of a property interest.”202 Yet, most states with 
forfeiture provisions currently do not provide any procedure 
allowing an alleged slayer to challenge the deprivation, which would 
likely constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of a protectable 
interest since no determination of guilt has yet been made.203 
Accordingly, states should amend their disposition of remains 
statutes to require a person statutorily deprived of the right of 
disposition to be given notice of the deprivation as well as the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. 
To adequately protect due process rights, forfeiture hearings 
should take place quickly before any action is taken with respect to 
                                                                                                             
 198. See Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
Louisiana has established a quasi-property right in remains and also finding that 
there were adequate state post-deprivation procedures); Whaley v. County of 
Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the next of kin have a 
constitutionally protected property interest in a decedent’s remains); Brotherton, 
923 F.2d at 482 (holding that the aggregate of rights granted to the next of kin rose 
to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement); Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 
287 F.3d 786, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the exclusive right of the next 
of kin to dispose of remains created a property interest entitled to due process 
protection); Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001) (holding “that in 
Florida there is a legitimate claim of entitlement by the next of kin to possession of 
the remains of a decedent for burial or other lawful disposition”). 
 199. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1505 (Westlaw 2013). 
 200. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 
 201. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 202. Id. To determine whether an administrative procedure comports with the 
Due Process Clause, a court must weigh the three factors identified by the 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. at 335. 
 203. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b. 
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the disposition of remains.204 This is because disposition decisions 
must be made shortly after death,205 and such decisions are often 
irreversible.206 State legislatures may choose which court they wish 
to be the proper forum for deciding such matters based upon which 
court in their jurisdiction is best suited to handle disposition 
disputes.207 Reasonable alternatives include the probate court, circuit 
court, or district court.208 Currently, some states do allow family 
members to petition the court to divest an alleged slayer of the right 
of disposition.209 However, instead of requiring a victim’s grieving 
family to use time, resources, and effort to revoke such rights from a 
slayer, automatic forfeiture provisions laying out an avenue to 
challenge the forfeiture in a hearing would be far more effectual.210 
Allowing a person deprived of the right of disposition the ability to 
contest the forfeiture adequately protects the due process rights of 
alleged slayers while also preventing any unnecessary burdens on 
victims’ families and the court system. 
                                                                                                             
 204. “[N]o fixed format, process, or procedure is demanded for a due process 
hearing . . . .” 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 1001 (Westlaw 2013). The 
exact nature of the due process hearing for cases involving the forfeiture of the 
right of disposition is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 205. “The law in most states requires that all bodies be buried shortly after 
death.” Brian L. Josias, Burying the Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying 
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Disputes Concerning the Interment of Bodies, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2004) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, 
disposition disputes “demand quick action” because “[b]odies must be buried, 
organs must be harvested, and healing for the next of kin must begin.” Id. at 1166.  
 206. Cremation is an irreversible method of disposition, and “[b]urial choices, 
once made, are often difficult if not impossible to reverse. If interment is the 
preferred method, laws in many states have stringent prohibitions on the 
exhumation of bodies. These laws make interment almost as irreversible as 
cremation in terms of long-term ramifications.” Id. at 1146 (footnote omitted). 
 207. Kester, supra note 20, at 613–14. 
 208. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (Westlaw 2013) (probate court); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3208 (Westlaw 2013) (circuit court); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-19-906 (Westlaw 2013) (district court). 
 209. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 115 (West 2003) (repealed and 
recodified as TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 152.101–152.102 effective Jan. 1, 2014); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.420 (Westlaw 2013). 
 210. The bringing of a dispute creates unnecessary burdens on the family. 
Right of disposition disputes “can make the loss of a loved one more difficult and 
can carry on for years after the death.” Theresa E. Ellis, Loved and Lost: Breathing 
Life into the Rights of Noncustodial Parents, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 293 (2005). 
Furthermore, “[e]nsuring fulfillment of the burial wishes of a deceased loved one 
should not require . . . surviving kin to enter into time-consuming and costly 
litigation.” Josias, supra note 205, at 1181. The survivors have already been 
victimized by losing their loved one—they should not be further required to 
challenge the right to make arrangements and to control his or her disposition. 
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CONCLUSION 
Legislatures have the power to prevent murder victims from being 
victimized after death and their survivors from being wronged a 
second time by ensuring that final disposition rights do not fall into 
the hands of slayers. The solution is a simple one—a disposition of 
remains statute containing a provision that calls for forfeiture if the 
person with the right to control disposition is a suspect likely to be 
prosecuted, arrested, or charged in connection with the decedent’s 
death. So long as there is a means for the accused to challenge the 
forfeiture in a timely manner, the statute will adequately protect due 
process rights as well as victims’ families who may otherwise have to 
watch their loved ones be disposed of by their slayers. Slayers should 
not be permitted to take advantage of their wrongdoing, and state 
statutes should not be the source granting slayers the right to do so. 
State legislatures must fight against domestic violence and amend 
their disposition of remains statutes to adequately protect victims and 
their families from the tragic consequence of flawed statutes—
slayers determining the final resting place of their victims. 
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APPENDIX: MODEL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS STATUTE 
Below is a comprehensive model statute regarding the right to 
control the disposition of a decedent’s remains. Subsections (B) and 
(C) address the problems presented in this Comment. Subsection (B) 
contains a clear order and priority of persons granted the right of 
disposition—including both disposition by declaration211 and 
disposition by law.212 Thus, all potential avenues for an individual to 
be granted the right of disposition are provided for in one location, 
and the order and priority of persons entitled to make disposition 
decisions is clearly delineated.213 Subsection (C) then contains the 
forfeiture provision, which unambiguously applies to any and all 
persons possessing the right of disposition as granted by Subsection 
(B).214 It also requires that the person subject to forfeiture be 
afforded notice and an opportunity to challenge the forfeiture in a 
timely manner.215 
The model statute also covers additional issues concerning the 
disposition of remains, including relevant definitions,216 other 
instances when forfeiture of the right of disposition may be 
appropriate,217 guidance for court determinations of disposition 
disputes,218 and provisions limiting practitioner liability.219 
Right to Control the Disposition of a Decedent’s Remains 
(A) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context 
otherwise clearly indicates, the following words and phrases 
shall have the meaning hereinafter ascribed to each: 
(1) “Declarant” means a competent adult who signs a 
declaration pursuant to the provisions of this article. 
(2) “Declaration instrument” means a written legal document 
executed by a competent adult to provide instructions as to 
final disposition and/or to appoint a designated agent(s) to 
                                                                                                             
 211. Disposition by declaration refers to the decedent providing instructions 
through a declaration instrument as to his or her disposition, as well as the 
decedent designating an agent to control his or her disposition through a 
declaration instrument. See Appendix subsection (B)(1)–(2). 
 212. Disposition by law occurs in the absence of a declaration or designation. 
See Appendix subsection (B). The question of the exact priority and order of 
persons delegated authority is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 213. See Appendix subsection (B). 
 214. See Appendix subsection (C). 
 215. See Appendix subsection (C). 
 216. See Appendix subsection (A). 
 217. See Appendix subsection (C). 
 218. See Appendix subsection (D). 
 219. See Appendix subsection (E). 
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control the decedent’s disposition. A declaration instrument 
shall be in writing, contain the date of its execution, be 
signed by the declarant, and notarized or witnessed in 
writing by at least one adult, other than the designated 
agent, who affirms that he or she was present when the 
legally competent adult signed and dated the document and 
that the legally competent adult appeared to be of sound 
mind and free from duress at the time of execution of the 
document. United States Department of Defense Record of 
Emergency Data Forms (DD Form 93) as well as prepaid 
funeral, burial, or cremation contracts also qualify as 
declaration instruments. The provisions of the most recent 
declaration instrument shall control over any other 
document regarding the disposition of remains. However, 
neither an anatomical gift document nor a declaration 
instrument shall invalidate the other in its entirety. If the 
two documents conflict, the more recent document shall 
control as to the conflicting provisions. 
(3) “Final disposition” means the final disposal of a decedent’s 
remains, which may include burial, aboveground interment, 
cremation, burial at sea, delivery to a medical institution for 
lawful dissection if the medical institution assumes 
responsibility for disposal, or other lawful disposition. 
(4) “Practitioner” refers to funeral directors, funeral service 
providers, cemetery authorities, and crematory authorities. 
(5) “Reasonably ascertainable” means the individual is able to 
be contacted without undue effort and willing and able to 
act in a timely manner. 
(6) “Right of disposition” means the right to make all 
decisions, consistent with applicable laws, regarding the 
handling of a decedent’s remains. 
(B) Right of disposition. The right to control the disposition of a 
decedent’s remains vests in and devolves upon the following 
persons, at the time of the decedent’s death, in the following 
order, except as provided in subsection (C): 
(1) the decedent, if providing disposition instructions through a 
valid declaration instrument; 
(2) the decedent’s designated agent(s) to control final 
disposition, if designated in a valid declaration instrument. 
If the designated agent is a spouse, a subsequent divorce, 
annulment, or legal separation automatically revokes the 
delegation, unless otherwise provided in the declaration 
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instrument or if the decedent appointed the spouse after the 
date of such divorce, annulment, or separation;220 
(3) the surviving spouse, domestic partner, or civil union 
partner, unless legally separated or a divorce or legal 
separation is pending; 
(4) the majority of the surviving adult children of the decedent 
whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable; 
(5) the surviving parents or legal guardians of the decedent 
whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable, unless 
parental rights have been terminated by court order; 
(6) a majority of the surviving adult siblings of the decedent 
whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable; 
(7) any adult person in the next degree of kinship in the order 
named by the law to inherit the decedent’s estate; 
(8) any other person willing to assume the responsibilities to 
act and arrange the final disposition of the decedent’s 
remains, including the personal representative of the 
decedent’s estate or the funeral practitioner with the 
custody of the remains, after attesting in writing that a good 
faith effort has been made to no avail to contact the 
individuals listed above. 
A person under this section shall act pursuant to any disposition 
wishes of the decedent, to the extent that they are known. 
(C)  Forfeiture of the right of disposition.221 Any individual granted 
the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s remains 
under subsection (B) forfeits this right and the right is passed 
on to the next qualifying person or persons under subsection 
(B) in the following circumstances: 
(1) the individual vested with the right declines to act, is unable 
to act because of death or disability, cannot be located after 
a good faith effort to do so within forty-eight hours after the 
time of death or the discovery of the body, or the individual 
does not exercise the right within three days of notification 
of the decedent’s death or within five days of the decedent’s 
death, whichever is earlier; 
(2) the individual was the subject of an order of protection at 
the time of the decedent’s death, or is identified by a law 
enforcement agency as a suspect likely to be prosecuted or 
is arrested or charged with first or second degree murder or 
                                                                                                             
 220. This provision is derived from Delaware’s statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, § 268 (West 2006). 
 221. Much of this subsection is derived from Vermont’s statute relating to 
forfeiture of the right to determine the disposition of a decedent’s remains. VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5228 (Westlaw 2013). 
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voluntary manslaughter in connection with the decedent’s 
death, if the status of the investigation, arrest, or charge is 
known to the practitioner, except the right shall be returned 
to the individual in the following circumstances: 
(a) if the prosecution is not pursued or the individual is 
acquitted of the alleged crime before the remains are 
disposed of; or 
(b) if, after the individual is afforded notice and an 
opportunity to appear in person or by counsel, or both, 
at a timely hearing on the matter, the court of 
competent jurisdiction determines that the forfeiture is 
not in the interest of justice; 
(3) if the court of competent jurisdiction determines that, 
pursuant to subsection (D), another person is most fit and 
appropriate to carry out the right of disposition; or 
(4) as otherwise ordered by the court of competent jurisdiction. 
(D)  Court determination.222 Notwithstanding other provisions of 
this section, the court of competent jurisdiction in the state of 
the decedent’s domicile may determine the individual(s) most 
fit and appropriate to control the disposition of the decedent’s 
remains or resolve a dispute regarding the disposition of the 
decedent’s remains. It may also choose to set aside forfeiture of 
the right of disposition in the interest of justice. 
(1) The following persons may file a petition in the court of 
competent jurisdiction: 
(a) before a decedent’s death, the decedent or the 
decedent’s legal representative; 
(b) a relative of the decedent; 
(c) a person who claims and establishes through evidence 
that the person had a closer personal relationship to the 
decedent than the next of kin; 
(d) the person subject to forfeiture of the right of disposition 
pursuant to subsection (C); or 
(e) the funeral service or crematory practitioner with 
custody of the remains. 
(2) In making its decision as to the individual most fit and 
appropriate to control disposition or to resolve a dispute 
regarding disposition, the court shall consider the following 
factors: 
(a) the decedent’s expressed or known directions or wishes; 
(b) the decedent’s religious affiliation or beliefs; 
                                                                                                             
 222. This subsection contains statutory provisions from Maine and Vermont. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A (Westlaw 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 
5231 (Westlaw 2013). 
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(c) the cost and practicality of the proposed arrangements 
and disposition and the ability of the responsible party 
or parties to pay for the proposed arrangements and 
disposition; 
(d) the relationship between the decedent and any 
individual claiming the right of disposition, including 
whether the individual and the decedent were 
estranged or had a relationship characterized by 
hostility or violence; 
(e) whether the proposed arrangements are inclusive of the 
desires of the family; 
(f)  the degree to which the arrangements will allow 
maximum participation by all wishing to pay respect; 
and 
(g) any other information the court, in its discretion, deems 
relevant. 
(E) Practitioner liability.223 The following provisions apply to the 
actions and liability of funeral directors, funeral service 
practitioners, cemetery authorities, or crematory authorities and 
their employees. 
(1) If there is a dispute regarding the right of disposition, the 
practitioner may refuse to accept, inter, or otherwise 
dispose of the remains until the practitioner is provided with 
a court order or the parties to the action submit a final 
stipulation approved by the court regarding the disposition 
of remains. 
(2) If there is a dispute regarding the right of disposition, the 
practitioner who has physical possession of the remains 
may embalm or refrigerate and shelter the remains while 
the action is pending. The costs shall be the responsibility 
of the party or parties who contracted with the practitioner, 
the person or entity who is otherwise liable for the costs of 
final disposition, or the estate as ordered by the court, or 
any combination of these, and the court may include in the 
order a decision concerning which of these shall be 
responsible for paying these costs. 
(3) If a practitioner commences an action under this section, the 
practitioner may ask the court to include an order against 
the estate or the parties for reasonable legal fees and costs. 
(4) A practitioner is not required to independently investigate 
to determine who has the right of disposition or who is next 
of kin. 
                                                                                                             
 223. This subsection contains statutory provisions from Maine and Vermont. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5231. 
2013] COMMENT 253 
 
 
 
(5) A practitioner who, in good faith, acts upon the instructions 
of the party it reasonably believes holds the right of 
disposition shall not be held civilly or criminally liable, or 
be subject to disciplinary action, for acting in accordance 
with those instructions. 
  
